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esses between reactor systems and the contain-

ment in existing nuclear power plants.

6. Applied research in the field of

radiological

protection

ranges from the technology used

to measure radiation to aero-radiometry and

the development of new methodologies for ra-

dionuclide analyses. In addition, the involve-

ment of ENSI in the development of interna-

tional norms is contributing to the cross-border

harmonisation of radiological protection meth-

ods.

7. With work continuing on the procedures speci-

fied in the Sectoral Plan for deep geological re-

positories, research into

disposal

is of increas-

ing importance. In addition to the ongoing re-

search at the Mont Terri Rock Laboratory into

Opalinus Clay as a host rock, the research in-

cludes in this case the design and monitoring of

deep repositories, the properties of radioactive

waste, the development of gases and the influ-

ence on possible future glaciers. ENSI is also

supporting a new project at the University of

Bern looking at the long-term development of

the landscape of the northern alpine foreland

and is increasing its involvement in an OECD

Working Group dealing with the disposal of ra-

dioactive waste in clay host rocks.

Instructive events from nuclear

facilities abroad

Incidents in nuclear facilities are an important el-

ement of operational experience as they provide

tangible evidence of weaknesses and offer the po-

tential for improvements in all areas of design and

operation. Information on incidents in Swiss nu-

clear facilities is contained in the ENSI Surveillance

Report. The Research and Experience Report pro-

vides information on a selection of particularly in-

structive incidents in nuclear facilities outside Swit-

zerland. Incidents are analysed with a view to iden-

tifying any potential relevance to Swiss nuclear fa-

cilities. From the perspective of ENSI, the main out-

comes were as follows:

− The accident at Fukushima was by far the most

important event in 2011. The strongest earth-

quake ever recorded in the history of Japan oc-

curred on 11 March on the North-East coast

of Japan. Although the nuclear power plants

withstood the immediate effects of the earth-

quake, the tsunami triggered by the earth-

quake subsequently destroyed numerous auxil-

iary units, water-supply systems, piping, etc. at

Fukushima Dai-ichi. The on-site power and cool-

ant supply failed and despite emergency man-

agement measures, it was impossible to avoid

serious damage to four of the six reactor units

at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The resultant release of

radiation into the environment was significant

and the accident was classified as level 7, the

highest on the INES Scale. The area around the

power station was largely evacuated.

ENSI established an internal, inter-disciplinary

group to conduct an in-depth analysis of the

accident in order to identify whether it could

have implications for the safety of nuclear pow-

er plants in Switzerland. The results were pub-

lished in four reports between August and De-

cember 2011 (http://www.ensi.ch/de/dossiers/

fukushima-2/). The five main lessons are as fol-

lows:

❚ First and foremost, the

design

of any nucle-

ar power plant must accurately reflect the lo-

cal hazard profile. To a large extent, this de-

termines the robustness of each plant and its

ability to prevent a serious accident. The haz-

ard profile assumed for each individual loca-

tion must be reviewed regularly and then re-

defined to reflect the current state of science

and technology.

❚ If despite this, an accident does occur,

emer-

gency equipment and procedures

capable

of limiting its consequences must be available;

in particular this must include emergency die-

sel generators, systems to prevent hydrogen

explosions, filtered containment venting and

adequate technical decision-making tools for

accident management purposes (Severe Acci-

dent Management Guidance SAMG). The ac-

cident management must be designed to cov-

er all operating conditions and all phases of

a serious accident, including difficult external

conditions. This includes the lengthy failure of

all AC sources and the ultimate heat sink. The

required equipment must also be stored exter-

nally and capable of being transported to a lo-

cation, for example by helicopter.

❚ The

emergency management system

out-

side the plant must function even under diffi-

cult conditions such as infrastructure destruc-

tion. It must, therefore be prepared accord-

ingly. Clear action must be taken to protect

the public and evacuations from the vicinity

of the power plant must be well planned and

properly regulated.

ENSI Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2011

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