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ENSI Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2011

utility, using its full-scope training simulator. The

OECD Halden Project is also supporting the U.S.

study with its staff as part of the Project’s Joint Pro-

gramme, to which Switzerland (ENSI) contributes.

Additionally, a diverse group of partners including

industry, regulators, and research institutes, are

contributing on the assessment group as well as

in the HRA analyst teams. In addition to PSI, these

include EPRI, Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho

National Laboratory, SAIC, all US; NRI, Czech Rep.

PSI is participating in a task group within the OECD

NEA / Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installa-

tions (CSNI), «Establishing Desirable Attributes of

Current Human Reliability Assessment Techniques

In Nuclear Risk Assessment». This task, led by the

U.K. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, is a joint

task of the Working Group on Human and Orga-

nizational Factors and the Working Group on Risk

Assessment. Its aim is to perform an international

technical evaluation of HRA methods, considering

criteria shared by the member countries and oth-

er common criteria. The task group held its first

meeting in Sept. 2011, with the next meetings

planned for March and September/October 2012.

The work related to crew-plant simulation for safe-

ty assessment is supported by a cooperation with

the University of Maryland (Prof. A. Mosleh), on

the ADS software tool for dynamic event tree anal-

ysis [11, 12].

Assessment 2011

and Perspectives for 2012

EOC plant-specific pilot study III

1. Organization of EOC Pilot Study III with a Swiss

plant.

The pilot study will be initiated in 2012, based on

the agreement reached in 2011 with a Swiss plant.

Quantification of EOCs

2. Revision of CESA-Q guidance, focusing on

traceability and scope.

In the developed model-based quantification, the

human error probability is the direct output of the

model. This decreases the element of judgment

(which is typically leading to low traceability and

repeatability) required for the analyst: once ap-

propriate evaluations of the CESA-Q factors are

made, the probability derivation does not need

any additional judgment from the analyst. A re-

port on the developed quantification approach

will be completed in early 2012.

While the 2011 revision of CESA-Q focused on

the quantification element, the main objective for

2012 is the revision of the method guidance for

qualitative error analysis, focusing on additional

reference analyses that support identification of

challenging conditions inducing more likely errors.

This would extend the scope of the method to sit-

uations outside the current coverage of the CESA-

Q database.

Simulator Data for HRA

and Method Assessment

3. Evaluation of HRA predictions and method as-

sessment in the U.S. HRA Empirical Study.

The preliminary evaluation in the U.S. study was

completed and reviewed with the analysis teams

at a workshop hosted by the US NRC in Rock-

ville, MD, USA, in June 2011. The results will be

presented publically in two contributions to the

PSAM11 conference in June 2012. The final re-

port on the U.S. study is scheduled to be complet-

ed in 2012. In parallel, the study assessment team

is completing a final overall report on the Interna-

tional Study, also to be published in 2012. The U.S.

study confirmed many of the earlier international

study results, its final report focuses on the consis-

tency of predictions and of method performance

across analysis teams.

4. Derivation of scenario-specific lessons for HRA

from the data collected in the simulator studies of

the HRA benchmarks.

These lessons are presented in the Internation-

al HRA Empirical Study final report, to appear in

2012.

Technical Basis for Seismic HRA

5. Detailed overview of earthquake experiences at

selected nuclear power plants.

The survey of earthquake experiences at nuclear

power plants, focused on the human performance

elements, highlighted several issues relevant for

seismic HRA: interaction of non-safety-related

damage with emergency response, weaknesses

in limited aspects of emergency plans, the impact

of those weaknesses on personnel workload. The

survey included only 1 event approaching the de-

sign basis safe shutdown earthquake level (Suru-

ga Bay, 2009, for Hamaoka Unit 5), which means

that there was no or very limited damage to safe-

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