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189

ENSI Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2011

cases above and the 2003 earthquake in San Sime-

on, California, USA, are summarized next.

The 2003 San Simeon earthquake resulted in 0.04 g

horizontal acceleration in the control room of the

Diablo Canyon NPP (2 units) and the plant contin-

ued to operate, in accordance with planning. No-

tification of the authorities and inspection of the

plant were performed, according to the require-

ments for such an event. The utility’s report to the

nuclear authority provides details relevant to as-

sessing the personnel’s workload. It notes that nu-

merous alarms, associated with the movement of

fluids in tanks, were activated in both units; these

were cleared and returned to normal after the seis-

mic activity stopped. Personnel were dispatched

to the affected systems for visual inspection and a

plant inspection walk-down using a specific pro-

cedure was initiated. Timed from the earthquake,

the walk-down started at 14 minutes, the emer-

gency operations facility was staffed at 20 min-

utes, the authorities were notified at 25 minutes.

The plant declared a Notice of Unusual Event at 6

minutes and maintained this state for 24 hours,

until inspections were completed as well as due to

the aftershocks. The latter suggests that an earth-

quake is not a punctual event: the activities of the

personnel do not return to a fully normal state for

an extended period after the main earthquake.

In the 2007 Chuetsu earthquake, all 3 operat-

ing units (3, 4, and 5) and 1 unit in start-up (2)

at the Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPP shut down auto-

matically. The event was classed INES 0 (the low-

est on the scale). Only equipment with low safe-

ty importance failed; the most notable may be the

fire at the Unit 3 house transformer, which had

a social impact due to media reports, both local

and worldwide. There was significant damage to

non-safety related equipment. The reports note

that even for this non-safety related equipment,

measures were needed to address widespread im-

pacts from common cause failures, there were ad-

verse interactions with safety-related equipment,

and the fire piping failed. The personnel’s ability

to respond and the response to the earthquake

and its consequences were affected by a) a dam-

aged entrance door to the Technical Support Cen-

ter, which prevented access to the dedicated line

for contacting the fire station, b) the lack of a

24-hour fire brigade, and c) the reliance of trans-

former fire protection on fire walls and the lack of

chemical fire-fighting engines. This event suggests

that even when safety-related equipment and sys-

tems are to a large degree unaffected by the earth-

quake, damage to non-safety-related equipment

can lead to a sustained increase in the workload

of the personnel. In addition, there can be interac-

tions between safety-related and non-safety relat-

ed equipment, and between equipment and facil-

ity damage and the personnel’s ability to respond.

With the exception of the tsunami effects at Fuku-

shima in the March 2011 earthquake, the earth-

quake experience at NPPs shows limited to very

limited damage to safety-related equipment and

limited or no adverse effects to the public and en-

vironment. (Note that at Fukushima, the tsunami

and its effects caused most of the damage to safe-

ty-related equipment. Assessment of the extent of

seismic damage to equipment is on-going.) With

few exceptions, the reports on the surveyed events

provide relatively little information regarding the

challenges facing the personnel and the details of

personnel performance. It can be seen that dam-

age to non-safety-related equipment may lead to

a sustained workload for the personnel; further-

more, communication with the authorities, me-

dia, the public represent a significant additional

workload.

National Cooperation

The research within the HRA project is oriented to

issues relevant for the Swiss nuclear power plants

and to the conditions at these facilities. Although

events from the international experience are used

in the work, e.g. to identify error mechanisms in

a broad range of settings, the interpretation and

application of this information is oriented to the

Swiss situation. It considers the procedures and

practices at each of the Swiss plants.

Agreement was reached with a Swiss plant to per-

form the third plant-specific pilot study on Errors

of Commission, as foreseen in the project.

International Cooperation

In a follow-on effort to the International HRA Em-

pirical Study, PSI is contributing to the benchmark

design and HRA method assessment. The U.S.

HRA Empirical Study is a cooperation between the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a U.S.

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